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Abstract 
 
Diplomatic assurances are State promises not to mistreat the transferred individual 
upon his or her return and are generally sought from governments known to commit 
human rights violations. A number of governments continue to use diplomatic 
assurances to send individuals to countries known for violations of human rights. 
WikiLeaks recently revealed that US Government officials concluded that the end of 
the road on diplomatic assurances has been reached. The human rights community, 
however, still struggles to convince States to abstain from diplomatic guarantees. How 
can the human rights community produce arguments that work? Current approaches 
often weakly articulate the link between legal arguments and empirical evidence on the 
practical effects of assurances. Factual accounts of the effects stemming from 
diplomatic assurances, coupled with the most compelling legal arguments, can 
strengthen the human rights community’s stance against the use of diplomatic 
promises. Meeting the requirements of international law with respect to the use of 
diplomatic assurances in the context of State efforts in countering terrorism is 
inherently elusive. A decade after September 11, there is abundant evidence to 
demonstrate that diplomatic assurances, in practice, do not minimise the human rights 
violations that occur during and after the transfer of an individual at risk. By 
systematically explaining the legal requirements for diplomatic assurances, this article 
provides a framework for evaluating diplomatic assurances in individual cases should 
governments continue to use them.  
 
Keywords: diplomatic assurances, non-refoulement, protection against torture, 
terrorism, treaty-law 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In December 2010, WikiLeaks revealed that the US Government no longer believed that 
diplomatic assurances provide adequate safeguards against torture and mistreatment, at least 
not with the recently overthrown Ben Ali Government of Tunisia. Diplomatic assurances are 
promises made by the receiving State to ensure the individual to be transferred to its territory 
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is treated in accordance with conditions set by the sending State or, more generally, in 
keeping with human rights obligations under international law.
1
 Diplomatic assurances are 
typically sought from governments known for human rights abuses. Cables released by 
WikiLeaks document that in November 2008, the US Embassy in Tunis reported to 
Washington that it did not believe that diplomatic assurances from the Tunisian Government, 
whatever their content, would offer significant protection to the detainees. The Tunisian 
authorities ‘have denied reports [of NGOs] that one of the detainees transferred in 2007 was 
mistreated. The Embassy believes, however, the reports are credible. [...] [Future transferees] 
are likely to face similar treatment. We do not believe further assurances [...] will change this. 
[...] Our conclusion: we are at the end of the road regarding assurances from the [Government 
of Tunisia]’.2 
 
Despite this forewarning, the United States and numerous European governments have 
continued to rely on diplomatic assurances. In July 2010, US authorities transferred an 
Algerian national detained in Guantánamo back to Algeria, explaining that the Algerian 
Government had promised not to torture Mr. Naji upon his return.
3
 Mr. Naji was part of a 
group of Guantánamo detainees who fear returning to their home countries to the extent that 
they have begged authorities to allow them to remain in prison, despite never having been 
charged. A bill signed by President Obama on 7 January 2011 forbids the use of military 
funds to transfer Guantánamo inmates to the United States, where they could face trial.
4
 This 
recent development makes it even more likely that the debate on diplomatic assurances will 
intensify, as efforts to transfer inmates cleared for release continue and most of these 
detainees come from States with poor human rights records. 
 
International law does not generally outlaw the use of diplomatic assurances, but establishes 
legal requirements for the use of such assurances in the context of terrorism. While human 
rights lawyers and government officials may agree on the legal requirements outlined in this 
article, their analysis of the effect of the practice of diplomatic assurances is fundamentally 
different. Whereas human rights lawyers draw from previous cases to supplement their legal 
arguments with empirical knowledge on diplomatic assurances, governments generally assert 
that diplomatic assurances aid in preventing torture and ill-treatment, with few exceptions. 
Through either lens, State reliance on diplomatic assurances cannot be effectively countered 
by recourse to legal arguments alone.  
 
Due attention must be paid to the interlocutory nature of legal arguments and the factual 
assumptions which condition the persuasiveness of international law arguments against the 
use of diplomatic promises. The US diplomats’ loss of faith in the efficacy of diplomatic 
assurances necessitates reconsideration of the legal arguments against the practice of such 
assurances. By identifying the available legal arguments, a framework for evaluating the 
value of diplomatic assurances in individual cases is provided. Legal arguments against the 
use of diplomatic assurances will be most convincing if they incorporate the empirical 
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knowledge about the misuse and inadequacy of such promises. It is hoped that the 
identification of available legal lines of reasoning will make it easier to convincingly link the 
legal arguments with the factual information on the effects of diplomatic assurances. 
Systematically connecting the legal arguments with the available empirical knowledge about 
the cases in which the use of diplomatic assurances has been documented suggests that States 
should not rely on diplomatic assurances.  
 
Section 1 introduces the conflicting views on diplomatic assurances. Section 2 deals with the 
rationale for diplomatic assurances, namely the principle of non-refoulement which prohibits 
transferring an individual to places where his or her fundamental rights would be threatened. 
Section 3 analyses the risk posed to individuals by State practice of diplomatic assurances 
based on the non-refoulement test. Section 4 outlines the tension between diplomatic 
assurances and the broader multilateral framework of human rights protection and explores 
treaty law as a tool for arguing against the use of diplomatic assurances that threaten to erode 
the regional and international protection against refoulement. 
 
 
2. Why Diplomatic Assurances? Two Conflicting Narratives 
 
Reliance on diplomatic assurances is not a novel phenomenon. In practice, early diplomatic 
assurances have centred on extradition agreements between States, particularly in death 
penalty cases or if the requested State had concerns about the fairness of judicial 
proceedings.
5
 In the aftermath of attempts to counter terrorism following 9/11, authorities 
have increasingly relied on assurances in contexts such as expulsion, deportation and 
extraordinary renditions.
6
 
 
State reliance on diplomatic assurances against the use of torture is affected by two 
simultaneous trends. On the one hand, the position of the individual in international law has 
undoubtedly been strengthened since World War II and States would not rely on diplomatic 
assurances if they were not at least rhetorically concerned about international law. At the 
same time, post 9/11 developments prove States’ increased ‘securitisation’ of migration 
issues, i.e. in viewing migrants as potential threats to national security.
7
  
 
According to States, it is unacceptable to allow ‘dangerous individuals’ to remain within their 
territory or jurisdiction.
8
 States often argue that a conviction before a criminal court would be 
illusive, either because of a lack of evidence or because  the authorities’ determination of the 
persons ‘dangerousness’ is based on secret intelligence information that cannot be presented 
in court. Terrorist suspects are often nationals of States with poor human rights records, 
giving rise to concerns about torture.
9
 Denouncing the non-refoulement principle or the 
prohibition of torture does not seem to be an attractive option for most States, although some 
                                                 
5
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6
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7
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authorities have made statements that draw this conclusion into question.
10
 When eliminating 
the risk of torture is not viewed as a priority over accepting diplomatic assurances from States 
with a marred human rights record, diplomatic assurances can be perceived as the best 
available ‘quick fix’.  
 
A number of governments, including Austria, Canada, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Russia, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the US have resorted to diplomatic 
assurances, maintaining that assurances were a legitimate tool to ‘address both the risk of 
terrorist action and the risk of the men being mistreated’.11 The British Government, for 
instance, has exerted considerable effort in requesting the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) to overturn its previous case-law with regard to ‘foreign nationals in the United 
Kingdom who pose a grave threat to national security but whom the government is unable to 
deport’.12 In the Chahal case in 1996, the ECtHR held that diplomatic assurances are 
insufficient in eliminating the risk of prohibited treatment in all cases, and that the ‘activities 
of the individual, however undesirable or dangerous, cannot be a material consideration’ in 
determining whether or not the person may be exposed to a risk of persecution, torture or ill-
treatment.
13
 According to the British Government at the time, this case-law seriously 
endangers the right to life of inhabitants in Britain since States are prevented from removing 
foreign terrorist suspects. The UK Government framed its arguments through a human rights 
lens and made extensive use of a right to life argument in its attack on the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR.
14
 In a similar vein, at least one academic commentator has recently argued that 
States’ obligation to protect the public from aliens suspected of terrorism implied that the 
non-refoulement principle should no longer be considered an absolute rule.
15
  
 
Critics of diplomatic assurances tell a very different story. Human rights organisations and 
refugee agencies have underscored that past assurances have been unreliable in protecting the 
concerned individuals.
16
 In addition, they emphasise the threats that the use of diplomatic 
assurances pose to the multilateral protection system and the absolute ban on torture.
17
 
According to this view, using diplomatic assurances comes with serious risks of eroding the 
framework of human rights protection and fails to address the underlying problem that the 
receiving State does not uphold existing obligations under international law. 
 
The two conflictive narratives both make use of human rights language and argue to serve the 
interests of human rights protection. Against this background, it is urgent to not only identify 
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the requirements of international law in relation to the use of diplomatic assurances, but also 
to assess whether these requirements are likely to be met in practice.  
 
 
2.1. The International Prohibition against Refoulement 
 
Diplomatic assurances are only relevant where there are concerns about the non-refoulement 
principle. This principle means that a person must not be returned if there are substantial 
grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to prohibited 
treatment upon return.
18
 The principle is grounded in three branches of international law, with 
slight nuances.  
 
 
 2.1.1. Non-refoulement in Refugee Law  
 
Under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (as amended by the 1967 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees) and customary international law, refugees are 
protected from being expelled or returned to territories where their life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion.
19
  
 
The 1951 Convention provides for some exceptions to the principle of non-refoulement: 
Article 33 stipulates that the benefit of the non-refoulement provision may not be claimed by 
‘a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the 
country in which he is’, and ‘a refugee having been convicted by a final judgment of a 
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.’ Article 1F 
of the Refugee Convention excludes applicants from refugee status (and therefore from the 
non-refoulement provision of the 1951 Convention) if there are serious reasons for 
considering that he or she has committed certain serious crimes prior to the arrival in the host 
country.
20
 Individuals falling under the exceptions of the Refugee Convention have no 
protection against refoulement under refugee law, but this finding does not automatically 
imply that a person may be returned as State obligations under human rights law remain 
applicable.
21
 
 
 
 2.1.2. Non-refoulement in Human Rights Law 
 
Human rights law contains broader non-refoulement rules than refugee law. The most well-
known non-refoulement provision at the international level is Article 3 of the UN Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT). 
It is widely accepted that this provision reflects customary international law.
22
 The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European Convention 
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for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) include implicit 
rights to non-refoulement.
23
 Other explicit non-refoulement provisions exist at the regional 
level.
24
  
 
The sending State has a duty to assure itself, prior to implementing any measure, that the 
person whom it intends to remove will not be exposed to the danger of serious human rights 
violations. Most court cases have dealt with non-refoulement in relation to violations of 
provisions concerning the right to life and the prohibition of torture, but non-refoulement in 
human rights law may also encompass norms protected by other provisions.
25
  
 
The 1996 Chahal case before the ECtHR stands for the Court’s conclusion that the UK could 
not deport Mr. Chahal to India even if the government considered his deportation necessary to 
protect national security.
26
 Confirmed by other human rights bodies, the absoluteness and 
non-derogability of the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment mean that the non-refoulement 
rule applies to all circumstances and to all individuals equally.
27
 The concerted attempts by 
some governments to change these rules and the case-law on Article 3 of the ECHR have 
failed.
28
 In Saadi v. Italy, the UK intervened as a third-party and complained that the approach 
adopted in Chahal was too ‘rigid and therefore had to be altered’ in view of the terrorist threat 
today.
29
 The UK argued that the benefit of the doubt should be given to a State intending to 
deport a person and that the threat posed by the individual should be a relevant factor weighed 
against the possibility of potential treatment contrary to Article 3. While the Grand Chamber 
acknowledged that States face difficulties in protecting their communities from violence, it 
unanimously and emphatically rejected the views of the Italian Government as well as those 
of the UK. The Grand Chamber affirmed its previous position in the Chahal case that the 
conduct or the ‘dangerousness’ of the person was irrelevant in the non-refoulement test.30 The 
UK argued that applicants whom the State considers dangerous must be required to fulfil a 
higher standard of proof. In other words, terrorist suspects must adduce more evidence to 
prove that they would be at risk of ill-treatment in the receiving country than other 
applicants.
31
 The Court held that this argument was diametrically opposed to the object and 
purpose of the ECHR, which is to protect individuals from the ‘interests of the executive 
branch’.32 State interests cannot override absolute rights.  
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 2.1.3. Non-refoulement in International Humanitarian Law 
 
The laws of armed conflict also contain a non-refoulement provision. Applicable to situations 
of armed conflict or occupation, the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that a protected 
person may in no circumstances be transferred to a country where he or she may have reason 
to fear persecution for his or her political opinions or religious beliefs.
33
 
 
 
3. Evaluating Diplomatic Assurances during the Individual Risk 
 Assessment Stage 
 
Although international law does not per se prohibit the use of diplomatic assurances, courts 
and human rights treaty-bodies that have not ruled out diplomatic assurances as such have 
also deemed them insufficient in the vast majority of cases.
34
   
 
Diplomatic guarantees are only relevant for supervisory bodies if they have an impact on 
assessing the risk faced by the concerned individual(s). Supervisory bodies must evaluate the 
risk posed to the individual facing prohibited treatment. Diplomatic assurances form part of 
the elements to be assessed in making this determination.
35
 
 
The various instruments each contain, or have been interpreted to provide, a slightly different 
standard of scrutiny. Before the UN Committee against Torture (CAT), the complainant must 
substantiate that there are ‘substantial grounds for believing that he [or she] would be in 
danger of being subjected to torture’.36 Before the ECtHR, the applicant bears the burden to 
convince the Court that there are ‘substantial grounds for believing that the person in 
question, if expelled, would face a real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment in the receiving country’.37 The ECtHR takes into account 
that the occurrence of prohibited treatment is an event that may or may not occur in the future 
and therefore cannot be proven before the expulsion. As Judge Zupančič eloquently pointed 
out, the problem with this standard is that ‘one cannot prove a future event to any degree of 
probability because the law of evidence is a logical rather than a prophetic exercise’.38 The 
applicant therefore does not have to prove ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ that (s)he would suffer 
ill-treatment. Moreover, a ‘real risk’ is not necessarily a high or substantial probability. In 
Soering, the ECtHR found a violation even if it agreed with the government that no 
assumption can be made that Mr Soering would certainly or even probably be subject to 
solitary confinement while awaiting execution of a death sentence.
39
 For either instrument, the 
decisive but difficult test is to assess the risk that would be faced by the specific individual at 
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34
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36
 UNCAT, Article 3.  
37
 Soering v. The United Kingdom, application no. 14038/88 (1989), ECtHR at para. 88. Chahal v. UK, para. 74. 
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the time of the removal, rather than merely to ascertain the existence or absence of diplomatic 
assurances.
40
 The ECtHR upheld this view in two recent cases against Italy: In Ben Khemais 
v. Italy and in Toumi v. Italy, the Court reiterated that diplomatic assurances did not suffice by 
and of themselves.
41
 In the same vein, a trial chamber of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) in June 2011 considered that diplomatic assurances cannot substitute an independent 
risk-analysis.
42
 
 
As soon as a claimant successfully substantiates a claim that he or she faces a risk of torture 
or ill-treatment, the government must therefore show that the specific assurance does, at a 
practical level, alter the risk assessment. Three criteria emerge from the case law to assess the 
factual value of diplomatic assurances in the non-refoulement test. Courts and other 
supervisory organs have rejected arguments in favour of deeming that such assurances 
sufficiently reduce the risks based on adequacy, effective control and credibility. 
 
 
3.1. Criteria in the Individual Risk Assessment 
 
 
 3.1.1. Adequacy 
 
Diplomatic assurances were deemed inadequate in altering the risk assessment in cases where 
they were phrased in unspecific terms, where they merely stated that the receiving State 
ratified human rights treaties, or where no mechanism was tasked to monitor compliance. 
Assurances that did not even contain a statement that the specific individual will not in fact be 
subjected to prohibited treatment were deemed insufficient in Soering v. UK.
43
 In Saadi v. 
Italy; the ECtHR held that the risk of ill-treatment was not displaced by the Tunisian 
guarantees because the note merely mentioned that Tunisia had acceded to human rights 
instruments.
44
 The CAT has held diplomatic assurances to be inadequate in Agiza v. Sweden 
based on the lack of any enforcement mechanisms.
45
 
 
 
 3.1.2. Effective Control 
 
In other cases, assurances were rejected on grounds that the promisor was not deemed to have 
effective control over the circumstances affecting the individual. In Chahal, the ECtHR 
concluded that even if the Indian Government gave the assurances in good faith, it did not 
have sufficient control over the security forces in Punjab.
46
 A British court halted an 
extradition to Russia because the judge found it ‘highly unlikely that the Minister would be 
able to enforce such an undertaking, given the nature and extent of the Russian prison 
                                                 
40
 Chahal v. UK, para. 105 (emphasis added). See fn. 13. The statement is repeated in Saadi v. Italy, para. 148. 
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41
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43
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97. See fn. 37. 
44
 Saadi v. Italy, para. 147. See fn. 14.  
45
 Agiza v. Sweden, para. 13.4. See fn. 40.  
46
 Chahal v. UK, para. 105. See fn. 13. 
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estate’.47 UNHCR argues that the promisor must be in a position to ensure compliance 
domestically if the assurances should be given any weight.
48
  
 
Although the application of this criterion may appear straightforward prima facie, courts and 
supervisory bodies should further clarify their approach on this issue. Existing case-law does 
not satisfactorily answer whether or under what circumstances the existence of a generally 
unsafe or abusive situation prevailing in the receiving country constitutes a sufficient ground 
for determining that a particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon 
return to that country. In Attia v. Sweden, the CAT answered in the negative.
49
 The ECtHR 
considers that ‘in the most extreme cases’, a situation of general violence would be of 
sufficient intensity to pose such a risk. Most recently, the ECtHR ruled in Sufi and Elmi v. UK 
that the United Kingdom cannot deport two Somali nationals because ‘the level of violence in 
Mogadishu is of sufficient intensity to pose a real risk of treatment reaching the Article 3 
threshold to anyone in the capital.’50 This position seems to automatically equate a situation of 
conflict with inhuman or degrading treatment in the sense of Article 3 of the ECHR. It seems 
reasonable to require that the applicant substantiates a certain level of ‘personalised risk’ and 
that a transfer should not be rendered unlawful because of a generally dangerous situation in 
the receiving country alone. At the same time, the generally insecure conditions in the 
receiving State provide the background against which it must be assessed whether the 
individual faces a ‘real risk’.  
 
Where a State has received diplomatic assurances, the real question should be whether the 
generally unsafe or abusive conditions in a State imply that the authorities will have no 
effective control over the implementation of the diplomatic guarantees and the circumstances 
affecting the individual after his or her return. In many cases, the answer to this question will 
advocate against the transfer, but a generally insecure and/or abusive situation alone does not 
render the transfer unlawful. This same logic applies to the evaluation of the fact that a 
government known for torture has provided the diplomatic assurance. Torture that is 
widespread in the receiving State does not automatically outlaw the transfer in all cases, and 
the ‘real risk’ faced by the individual must still be assessed. It is conceivable; at least 
theoretically, that an otherwise abusive State could potentially provide an assurance that 
eliminates the personal risk of the transferred individual, particularly when the individual 
remains in a situation of detention where the circumstances are more easily controlled by 
State authorities compared to a situation where an individual faces threats from a variety of 
sources. Nevertheless, this article shows that even in such hard to detect cases, the use of 
diplomatic assurances has corrosive effects on the multilateral system of human rights 
protection and should therefore be abstained from. 
 
 
 3.1.3. Credibility 
 
The credibility of the receiving State is another reason why diplomatic guarantees were not 
deemed to alter the risk assessment to a sufficient degree. Assurances have been rejected on 
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the basis that the promisor had previously breached similar undertakings. In Agiza v. Sweden, 
the CAT concluded that because Egypt had already breached a clause in the assurance relating 
to fair trial, the sending State could not rely on the diplomatic assurance.
51
 Similarly, the 
ECtHR did not deem credible the diplomatic assurances provided by the Tunisian authorities 
in the case of Ben Khemais v. Italy, concluding that simply because the applicant had not 
suffered ill-treatment immediately after his deportation, this was no credible prediction of the 
applicant’s future fate.52 In the most recent decision of the ECtHR on diplomatic assurances in 
Toumi v. Italy, the Court found that an assurance for a Tunisian national was not credible 
because the authorities consistently failed to investigate allegations of ill-treatment against 
other detainees. The Court therefore found incredible that the Tunisian justice system could 
guarantee respect of the diplomatic assurance.
53
 The ICC Trial Chamber II, on the other hand, 
accepted diplomatic assurances from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and found 
them to be credible because they were given within the general legal framework for 
cooperation between the ICC and the DRC.
54
 
 
These three considerations provide avenues to strengthen the legal arguments that diplomatic 
assurances fail to automatically eliminate the risk of prohibited treatment and why they do not 
sufficiently reduce this risk in many cases. At the same time, the normative quality, i.e. the 
legal bindingness of the diplomatic assurance, is not the decisive question in determining 
whether a specific assurance eliminates the risk of prohibited treatment. 
 
 
3.2. ‘To Bind or Not to Bind?’ Is the Wrong Question 
 
Most literature on diplomatic assurances focuses on their normative quality. A number of 
authors argue that only if the assurance is ‘unequivocally binding’, the risk assessment will be 
impacted at all.
55
 In other words, if the assurance was non-binding, one would not even have 
to examine the above mentioned three criteria. This view seems overly simplistic. Assessing 
the normative quality of the diplomatic promises is not particularly helpful in determining 
whether or not the risk faced by the individual is in practice eliminated. Indeed, supervisory 
bodies have not concentrated their analysis on a determination of the normative nature of 
specific assurances, but rather on the aforementioned criteria mentioned above. 
 
Whether or not diplomatic assurances are binding is important in discussing the relationship 
between assurances and the multilateral treaty instruments, such as the ICCPR or the ECHR 
(detailed further in section 4). However, as far as the individual non-refoulement test is 
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concerned, the relevant question is whether compliance is likely to result from the assurances 
and whether such compliance would eliminate the risk faced by the individual. Noll argues 
that if assurances were non-binding, they were ‘quite meaningless’.56 This finding holds true 
only under the assumption that the absence of legal bindingness per se has no effect on the 
risk assessment. Vice versa, even a legally binding diplomatic assurance does not imply that 
the person to be removed no longer faces a risk of prohibited treatment. After all, the idea that 
bindingness would be more likely to result in compliance is doubtful, given that the States 
providing diplomatic assurances have already proven their non-compliance with binding 
multilateral treaties; otherwise, no State would have to engage in seeking assurances.  
 
Theories outside the law may provide more clarity on whether compliance is likely to result 
from a diplomatic assurance, and whether such compliance eliminates the risk faced by the 
individual. Compliance theories ‘borrowed’ from international relations literature contribute a 
level of understanding in assessing the value of diplomatic assurances.
57
 State practice 
suggests that considerations of compliance theories indeed form part of the thinking on 
diplomatic assurances. Switzerland, for instance, argues that assurances are only appropriate 
in cases of extradition, and not in cases of return, because the requesting State only has a 
crucial interest in respecting the assurance in cases of extradition.
58
 British authorities have 
indicated that their assurances were significantly different from others because there would be 
‘serious bilateral consequences if things go wrong’.59 However, compliance theories inspired 
from international relations literature also indicate that by elevating an individual case to the 
diplomatic level, the individual becomes vulnerable to the exigencies of foreign relations.
60
 
Incentives will be strong for the sending State (or the individual diplomat tasked to visit the 
detainee) to turn a blind eye on non-compliance as detecting non-compliance would confirm 
critics’ suspicion that the removal was unlawful.61 Nor will the receiving State have an 
interest in detecting and reporting abuses and portray itself as an unreliable diplomatic 
partner. Compliance theories also caution that externalising monitoring is no panacea, inter 
alia because any detainee who reports abuse knows that the information is going to be 
transmitted back to the government of the detention facility. 
 
In sum, the risk assessment in the non-refoulement test is not primarily concerned with the 
normative nature of the diplomatic assurance, but its approximated effect in eliminating the 
risk faced by the individual. It follows that it cannot be excluded a priori that diplomatic 
assurances could result in a State’s legal removal of a person in a case where it would 
otherwise be prohibited. Such assurances would have to effectively eliminate the risk of 
prohibited treatment. Given that diplomatic assurances are issued by States known for human 
rights abuses, meeting the three criteria of adequacy, effective control and credibility is 
challenging. The use of diplomatic assurances is also problematic in respect of the effects on 
the multilateral human rights framework. 
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4. Evaluating Diplomatic Assurances in Relation to the Multilateral 
 Framework of Human Rights Protection 
 
What happens if States establish bilateral arrangements alongside human rights obligations 
erga omnes? While it was not urgent to resolve the question of the bindingness of assurances 
for the individual risk assessment, the normative quality of assurances is relevant to examine 
their effect on the multilateral treaty instruments. Should diplomatic assurances be considered 
legally binding undertakings (such as treaty modifications or unilateral declarations) or simply 
pieces of paper with political promises? This section identifies the legal arguments explaining 
why it is more likely than not that diplomatic assurances have a corrosive effect on the 
international human rights system. These legal arguments do not, however, conclusively 
resolve whether the giving and receiving of guarantees decreases the scope of the multilateral 
treaty, or on the other hand, whether it enhances protection. Hence, sound empirical analyses 
must be combined with the identified legal arguments in order to persuade governments to 
address the root causes of the problem, rather than resorting to the dangerous quick fix 
approach of diplomatic assurances. 
 
Divergent views have been expressed on the normative quality of diplomatic assurances. 
Diplomatic assurances vary considerably in form and content. They were granted for a 
particular individual or group of individuals in exchanges of notes verbales,
62
 while in other 
cases, governments have tried to systematise the use of assurances in memoranda of 
understanding (MoU) or by including general clauses in agreements governing the deportation 
of persons.
63
 Even if each assurance has to be assessed individually, some general remarks are 
possible. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),
64
 the 
Permanent Court of International Justice,
65
 and the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
66
 the 
designation of an instrument is irrelevant. The decisive factor is the intention of the parties to 
create legally binding rights and obligations.
67
  
 
In practice, determining the normative quality of diplomatic assurances is not clear-cut. Most 
human rights organisations have tended to downplay the normative quality of assurances and 
concluded that assurances do not normally constitute legally binding undertakings. 
Governments expressed divergent views. While the British Government argued that the 
assurances it obtained were non-binding understandings,,
68
 Switzerland expressed the view 
that it negotiated legally binding assurances.
69
 The language used in many of the known 
examples of diplomatic assurances indicates that the intention may not have been to create 
legal obligations.
70
 Aust convincingly argued that governments may prefer the non-binding 
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format for diplomatic assurances, because it offers procedural advantages such as 
confidentiality, flexibility and speed.
71
 
 
On the other hand, viewing diplomatic assurances as unbinding understandings cannot explain 
why governments have considered such guarantees as the condition for the legality of the 
removal from the onset.
72
 If authorities determined that without such an assurance, the 
removal would be illegal, they must have intended that the diplomatic assurance produces 
legal effects.
73
 In response to the question of whether assurances are biding or not will thus be 
confusing in most cases. The conundrum surrounding the legal nature of diplomatic 
assurances can best be described as a reflection of the unresolved tension between the 
relevance of international human rights law and the power of the State to limit certain 
freedoms when countering terrorism. States publicly announce how important they consider 
compliance with the non-refoulement principle. At the same time, they devise a tool with 
chameleon characteristics: depending on the audience and purpose, States either stress the 
legal effects of diplomatic assurances or emphasise the confidentiality and flexibility of 
‘understandings’ with their diplomatic peers. The following sub-sections outline the 
relationship between the assurance and the multilateral human rights framework from a 
treaty-law perspective assuming that a particular diplomatic assurance is legally binding.
74
 
 
 
4.1 Unlawful Treaty Modifications Inter Se? 
 
Legally binding diplomatic assurances could constitute modifications to existing multilateral 
treaties. Diplomatic assurances as bilateral modifications of treaty obligations require the 
notification of all parties to the said treaty,
75
 which may be far lengthier and more public than 
governments prefer. States are free to modify their treaty arrangements only if such 
modifications comply with the conditions in Article 41(1)b of the VCLT. The first condition 
stipulates that no modifications can be made if they affect the enjoyment by the other parties 
of their rights under the treaty.
76
 Since the prohibition of torture is an erga omnes obligation,
77
 
any assurances that provide a lower level of protection than the multilateral treaty are 
unlawful and would breach an existing legal obligation.
78
 Moreover, Article 41(1)b(ii) of the 
VCLT prohibits modifications which relate to ‘provisions, derogation from which is 
incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole’. 
Derogating from the torture prohibition is incompatible with treaties such as the UNCAT, the 
ICCPR or regional instruments such as the ECHR or the American Convention on Human 
Rights. 
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Hence, if empirical evidence points to a detrimental effect either to the ‘enjoyment by the 
other parties of their rights under the treaty’ or the ‘object and purpose of the treaty as a 
whole’, diplomatic assurances are unlawful. Human rights organisations or lawyers 
countering the use of a specific diplomatic assurance should try to show that a specific 
assurance protects a lower standard than the torture provision in the multilateral instrument 
and is thus incompatible with a non-derogable provision. For instance, any assurance that 
refers to physical torture rather than mental torture and ill-treatment is one that protects a 
lower standard than the torture provisions in the multilateral instruments.  
 
 
4.2 The Object and Purpose of Human Rights Treaties 
 
The International Law Commission (ILC) suggests that there is a broader ‘object and purpose’ 
argument related to systemic interests. Even if the ordinary meaning of a treaty does not 
preclude a conduct, such conduct is still unlawful if it undermines the object and purpose of a 
convention.
79
 In other words, even if the ordinary meaning of the multilateral human rights 
treaties nowhere specifically bars the use of diplomatic assurances, their use must not 
undermine the object and purpose of the instruments. 
 
Does the use of assurances, even if not explicitly prohibited, defy the object and purpose of 
multilateral conventions and is therefore unlawful? Taking the UNCAT as an example, the 
object and purpose of the Convention is undoubtedly the prevention of torture and ill-
treatment.
80
 At first sight, it seems a stretch to argue that assurances are per se inconsistent 
with the prevention of torture. Does the establishment of a bilateral system next to another 
one defy the object and purpose of the treaties? As mentioned, governments argue that they 
are reinforcing the protection against torture by directly confronting the country in question.
81
  
 
Both sides of the controversy can legitimately use the same legal arguments to express their 
(preconceived) answer. Noll explains that the ‘outcome of treaty law arguments depends 
entirely on a prior decision as to whether a specific diplomatic assurance constitutes an 
agreement to legalise certain forms of torture inter se, or an agreement to enhance protection 
from torture’.82 It follows from this observation that only empirical evidence can support the 
claim that a specific diplomatic assurance is unlawful because it indeed defies the object and 
purpose of the legal instruments prohibiting torture. Care must thus be taken to argue why, in 
practice, diplomatic assurances uphold and condone, rather than eliminate torture. This leads 
to the remaining three available legal arguments that counter the legitimacy of issuing or 
accepting diplomatic assurances: non-discrimination, State obligations to end gross or 
systematic torture and jus cogens. 
 
4.3  Non-discrimination 
 
Diplomatic assurances are highly problematic because they create a two tiered system among 
detainees. According to the multilateral framework of human rights, all detainees are entitled 
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to the equal protection of existing instruments.
83
 All detainees – and not only those transferred 
from another State with assurances – must be treated in accordance with international law. 
Out of concern for discrimination, the International Committee of the Red Cross and other 
agencies refuse to undertake monitoring in detention facilities unless they have global access 
to all individuals in that facility.
84
 Similarly, the establishment of guidelines on the use of 
diplomatic assurances was refused out of a fear of discrimination.
85
 
 
 
4.4. State Obligations to Bring to an End to Serious Breaches of International Law 
 
Moreover, the ILC’s draft articles on State responsibility suggest that the existence of gross or 
systematic torture in one country entails a positive obligation erga omnes to act against that 
violation and not to recognise or render aid in maintaining the unlawful situation.
86
 As an 
important caveat, these obligations only arise in the case of ‘gross or systematic failure’ and 
only in relation to peremptory norms of general international law.
87
  
 
Diplomatic assurances against torture are only sought when governments implicitly 
acknowledge that prohibited treatment takes place in the receiving country. No State seeks 
diplomatic assurances against torture if it does not at least implicitly recognise the reasonable 
probability that the receiving State violates the prohibition against torture, which is a 
peremptory norm of general international law.
88
 
 
If torture is committed at a gross or systematic scale, States must not render aid or assistance 
in maintaining the situation and they must see to it that the violation is brought to an end.
89
 If 
sending States seek assurances from States that torture systematically in order to spare one 
specific individual from torture, they essentially escape the two alternatives that they have 
themselves foreseen by agreeing to the non-refoulement principle: namely to either keep the 
individual within their jurisdiction or to cooperate to act against torture in the receiving 
country so that the individuals to be transferred no longer face a risk of prohibited treatment. 
Governments counter that they do not avoid their legal obligations, but that their diplomatic 
assurances enhance the rule of law. Legal advisors for the British Government claimed that 
they engage with NGOs on the ground, and provide capacity building and training on 
detection and reporting, which would from their perspective, ‘bring about change’.90 These 
arguments must be engaged with. As with the previous arguments, only sound empirical 
observations of past cases is able to provide convincing support for the legal argument that the 
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use of a specific diplomatic assurance amounts to recognition of a gross or systematic 
violation of a peremptory norm of international law. 
 
 
4.5. Jus Cogens 
 
Another treaty law argument is based on the observation that diplomatic assurances and 
treaties such as the UNCAT relate to the same subject matter. If the rule of lex posteriori 
derogat legi priori (the principle that a recent treaty rule prevails over a previous one when 
both treaties relate to the same subject matter) would apply, this would imply that the use of 
diplomatic assurances would prevail over other norms in the multilateral treaty. However, the 
jus cogens nature of torture prohibits such an application of the lex postieriori rule. Because 
the prohibition of torture is a peremptory norm, a diplomatic assurance which assures lower 
standards of protection than the international norms will be void and cannot render a transfer 
lawful.
91
 
 
Indeed, there have been cases where sending governments sought assurances against torture, 
but failed to insist that the receiving State guaranteed protection for the full scope of the 
prohibition of torture. The assurances sought by the Swedish Government, for instance, did 
not correspond to the international standards against torture. The Swedish Government 
accepted a ‘domestic law reservation’ by Egypt, notwithstanding the well-known objections 
of Sweden to such reservations: The Egyptian assurance ended by a confirmation that the 
treatment of returned individuals ‘will be done according to what the Egyptian constitution 
and law stipulate’.92 The CAT stressed that there was a considerable gap between the 
Egyptian legislation and the scope of the UNCAT.
93
 Because the international norms against 
torture extend significantly further than Egyptian legislation, and because the relevant 
international norms are part of jus cogens, it is not surprising that the diplomatic assurances 
sought by Sweden were held to be insufficient by the UN supervisory Committee.
94
 
Bilaterally diluting commitments against torture is incompatible with the jus cogens nature of 
the international norms and certainly inadequate to legalise an otherwise unlawful transfer. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
To conclude, legal arguments advocating against diplomatic assurances exist at two levels of 
analysis: the protection of human rights of the specifically concerned individual and the 
effects on the multilateral human rights framework. Diplomatic assurances could be 
considered lawful only if they cumulatively fulfilled the following two sets of requirements: 
First, relating to the concerned individual, the assurances must effectively reduce the risk of 
prohibited treatment below the standard of scrutiny of the relevant treaty and of customary 
international law – independent of whether the diplomatic assurance is legally binding or not. 
In this respect, the WikiLeaks cables cast further serious doubt on the reliability of diplomatic 
promises to diminish the risk of abuse in countries that routinely torture. Second, in relation to 
the effects of assurances on the broader multilateral level, diplomatic guarantees are only 
acceptable if they do not diminish the multilateral framework of human rights protection.  
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The analysis of the legal arguments has revealed that the final assessment of diplomatic 
assurances depends on factual assumptions made with regard to whether assurances diminish 
or enhance protection. The interpretation of many international norms depends on an 
assessment largely based on an interpretation of factual elements, probabilities and 
alternatives. The underlying problem is therefore not unique to diplomatic assurances, and has 
proven to be particularly acute in the context of States exercise of counter-terrorist measures. 
Rather than surrendering in the face of States’ attempts to use human rights discourse to 
defend procedures which they control themselves, human rights activists should continue to 
scrutinise governments’ arguments that assurances would enhance the system of protection. 
 
The legal arguments outlined above are most useful when coupled with factual evidence 
showing that governments’ assumptions on the positive effects of assurances are, more often 
than not, inaccurate. The framework presented here should therefore facilitate meeting the 
main challenge faced by the human rights movement: successfully pairing the legal arguments 
with the empirical evidence confronting governments’ rhetoric on the supposedly benevolent 
effects of such assurances against torture. This debate will continue to be particularly relevant 
in the near future. The closure of the Guantánamo detention facility (and others) is still 
outstanding and a solution has not been found for many of the remaining detainees. Human 
rights activists will need to State very clearly that closing the facility is not enough, but that 
the individuals must not be sent to places where they risk torture and other abuses. Most of 
those still at Guantánamo but cleared for release are nationals of abusive States. While the 
new military approbations bill of 2011 further restricts options to transfer detainees to US soil 
for trial,
95
 third States have only partially been forthcoming in accepting to host the most 
vulnerable of them. It is therefore predictable that the debate on diplomatic assurances will re-
emerge as an important issue to monitor for the human rights movement.  
 
Diplomatic assurances – as the term implies – are subject to the limits of diplomacy.96 Are 
there alternatives? States have interpreted provisions within human rights instruments to mean 
that they must either keep these individuals within their jurisdiction or, alternatively, work 
towards the eradication of torture in receiving States. Notwithstanding disagreement on the 
true effects of diplomatic guarantees, States must be urged to withstand the temptation of 
relying on diplomatic assurances. Although efforts towards the eradication of torture and ill-
treatment are not a short term endeavour, such efforts correspond to the object and purpose of 
the obligations that States have voluntarily accepted by negotiating, ratifying and by 
abstaining from amending a range of human rights instruments carefully elaborated in the 
aftermath of World War II.  
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